Protected against computers that don't exist yet

Aurora uses post-quantum cryptography, the same class of algorithms governments are adopting for their most sensitive communications. A message intercepted today could be stored and decrypted years from now once quantum computing matures; Aurora's encryption is designed to stay sealed against that.

Every primitive below pairs a post-quantum algorithm with a proven classical one, so an attacker has to break both (old technology and future technology) to get anywhere. Tap each to read its history and a plain-English explanation.

KYBER-1024 + X25519

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Post-quantum key exchange, resistant to both classical and quantum attacks.

Kyber was developed by cryptographers across Europe and the US and selected by NIST in 2022 as the first standardised post-quantum key-encapsulation algorithm, after six years of global competition. X25519 is a classical algorithm designed by Daniel J. Bernstein in 2005, trusted and used by Signal, WhatsApp, and TLS.

When you and another person first connect, your phones perform a handshake that establishes a shared secret only the two of you ever hold. Kyber makes that handshake resistant to quantum computers; X25519 covers classical threats. Using both means neither old nor future technology can break it: two locks on the same door, each needing a different kind of key.

XCHACHA20-POLY1305

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Authenticated symmetric encryption for every message, using a key that never leaves your devices.

ChaCha20 was designed by Daniel J. Bernstein in 2008 as a faster, more robust alternative to AES. XChaCha20 extends it with a larger nonce so no two messages are ever encrypted the same way, and Poly1305 is an authenticator that detects any tampering. The combination secures HTTPS traffic for billions of users.

This is what actually scrambles your messages. Once a shared secret exists between two devices, every message (text, photo, video) is sealed with it before it leaves your phone. The scrambled version is what crosses the internet. Without the secret, which exists only on your devices, it is indistinguishable from random noise.

DILITHIUM-3 + ED25519

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Post-quantum signatures that verify every message comes from the right device.

Dilithium (ML-DSA) was developed alongside Kyber and standardised by NIST in 2024 as a primary post-quantum signature scheme. Ed25519, designed by Bernstein and colleagues in 2011, is used by SSH, Signal, and most modern security infrastructure to verify identity.

Encryption hides what you say; signatures prove who said it. Each device's check-ins and pairing messages are signed with a key only it holds, and the other phone checks that signature before trusting them. If anything was altered in transit, the check fails and the message is rejected. No one can impersonate you or tamper with your words undetected.

HARDWARE-BACKED KEY STORAGE

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Your identity and database keys are protected by the phone's secure hardware.

The Android Keystore, expanded in Android 6.0 with hardware-backed storage, can hold keys inside a dedicated security chip (a Trusted Execution Environment) that operates independently of the main processor, so even a compromised OS cannot read them.

Aurora's post-quantum keys are large, too large to live inside the Keystore chip directly, so they're stored encrypted on disk under a master key that is held in the hardware-backed Keystore, and the local database is encrypted the same way. The keys are only ever unlocked in memory when the app needs them; they never exist on disk as readable files. Even with full access to your phone's storage, an attacker finds only ciphertext.

What the service cannot see

Most apps are vague about what they observe. We prefer to be exact.

Your message content
Who you are talking to
How often you talk
Photos or videos you share
Your name or identity
Your location
Your contact list

What it can tell, honestly. To wake your phone when someone messages you, the rendezvous server keeps a lightweight connection and a 15-minute record of your Node ID and IP address. So it can tell that your device is reachable, but never your messages, your media, or who you are, and it keeps no logs. If compelled by a court order to surrender your conversations, it could not: they exist only on your device. See the limits we're explicit about in How it works.